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Lone Wolves 
How to Prevent This Phenomenon? 
  
 
Introduction 
Perhaps one of the most puzzling and 
unpredictable forms of terrorism is provided 
by violent acts committed by a single 
individual. These so-called lone wolves are a 
nightmare for the police and intelligence 
community as they are extremely difficult to 
detect and to defend against. Compared to 
group terrorism or network-sponsored 
terrorists, lone operators have a critical 
advantage in avoiding identification and 
detection before and after their attacks, since 
most of them do not communicate with 
others with regard to their intentions. 
Although lone wolves might have the 
disadvantage of lacking the means, skills, 
and “professional” support of terrorist 
groups, some of them nonetheless have 
proven to be very lethal.  
 
Infamous examples from the United States, 
Israel and Europe include Baruch Goldstein, 
an American-born Israeli citizen who was 
responsible for the death of 29 Muslims 
praying in the Cave of the Patriarchs in 
Hebron; the Austrian Franz Fuchs, who used 
letter bombs to kill 4 and injure 15 people; 
US army major Nidal Malik Hasan, who is 
accused of a mass shooting at Fort Hood in 
which 13 people died and 30 were wounded; 
and the American mathematician Theodore 
Kaczynsky, also known as the “Una Bomber”, 
who engaged in a mail bombing spree that 
killed three and wounded 23. In addition, 
there have been several lone wolves who 
assassinated political leaders, such as Yigal 
Amir, the assassin of former Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin; Volkert van der Graaf, 
who killed the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn; 
and Mijailo Mijailovic, who is responsible for 
the death of the Swedish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Anna Lindh. These individuals and 
their violent acts exemplify the many 
differences in targets and modus operandi, 
as well the varieties in the political or 
ideological background of the perpetrators.  
 
In this paper, we investigate these different 
types of perpetrators and the possible 
increase of lone wolf terrorism due to 
mounting appeals in Islamist circles to strike 
against the West as a lone operator. In 
addition, we look into the challenge of 
countering lone wolf terrorism and map out 
possible responses to prevent attacks – 
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responses that at the same time respect 
fundamental freedoms and civil liberties. 
 
Defining the Term 
The term “lone wolf” was popularised in the 
late 1990s by white supremacists Tom 
Metzger and Alex Curtis as part of an 
encouragement to fellow racists to act alone 
in committing violent crimes for tactical 
reasons.1 Other terms that have been used to 
describe similar or comparable forms of 
political violence include “leaderless 
resistance’”2 and “freelance terrorism”.3 
 
In this paper, we use the term lone wolf and 
follow the definition of Burton and Stewart 
who, in a STRATFOR essay, define a lone wolf 
as “a person who acts on his or her own 
without orders from — or even connections to 
— an organisation”.4 They stress the 
difference with a sleeper cell, arguing that a 
sleeper is an operative who infiltrates the 
targeted society or organisation and then 
remains dormant until a group or 
organisation orders them into action. In 
contrast, “a lone wolf is a standalone 
operative who by his very nature is embedded 
in the targeted society and is capable of self-
activation at any time”.5 In our view, this 
definition includes individuals that are 
inspired by a certain group but who are not 
under the command of any other person, 
group or network. They might be members of 
a network, but this network is not a 
hierarchical organisation in the classical 
sense of the word.6 
 
The terms “targeted society” and “self-
activation” imply that the lone wolf is acting 
in a rational way and that his acts are aimed 
against that society or parts thereof. These 
acts are politically or religiously motivated 
and aim to influence public opinion or 
political decision-making. This excludes 
violent acts by standalone individuals that 
                                                     
1 TTSRL, 2007: p.13 
2 Kaplan 1997 
3 Kushner 2003: pp.144-5; Hewitt, 2003: p.79 
4 Burton and Stewart, 2008 
5 Ibid. 
6 Sageman, 2004 
are motivated for other reasons, such as 
Virginia Tech shooter Seung-Hui Cho or Matti 
Saari, who was responsible for the Jokela 
high school shooting in Finland and who 
seems to have been inspired by Cho. It 
should be noted that in some cases it is 
difficult to determine the motivations of the 
perpetrators; take for instance the case of 
Karst Tates, who drove his car into a crowd 
during the Dutch Queensday celebrations, 
killing eight individuals including himself, and 
who left no note or any other indication of his 
motivations. In this paper we also exclude 
those individuals whose politically motivated 
acts are only targeted against property or at 
insulting people – such as throwing pies at 
politicians. We solely focus on lone wolves 
who perpetrate acts aimed at taking away 
lives or who threaten to take away lives: the 
lone wolf terrorist.  
 
No Single Profile 
The above-mentioned definition of lone wolf 
terrorists comprises a wide variety of violent 
extremists. Among them are religious zealots, 
environmental and animal rights extremists, 
white supremacists and jihadists. Even at the 
level of the ideological or religious 
background there is much variety. For 
instance, among those who claim or justify 
their acts in the name of a religion are 
individuals of all faiths. It includes Islamist 
lone wolves like Nidal Malik Hasan and 
Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, who 
opened fire on a US military recruiting office, 
as well as anti-Semitic/Christian-identity 
adherents like Buford Furrow, who attacked a 
Jewish Community Center, and Eric Rudolph, 
also known as the Olympic Park Bomber, who 
was the perpetrator of a series of bombings 
that killed two people and injured at least 
150 others. The term further includes radical 
Roman Catholics like James Kopp and radical 
Protestants like Scott Roeder, who both killed 
a physician who performed abortions. 
 
Obviously, there is no single, standardised 
profile of a lone wolf. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to distinguish between different 
categories of lone wolf terrorists based on 
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their ideological or religious background. In 
addition, there are a number of 
commonalities shared amongst the various 
types of lone wolves. One of the problems for 
both counter-terrorism practitioners and 
academics is the relatively low number of 
terrorists who act on their own without orders 
from or even connections to an organisation. 
According to a study by the Dutch Institute for 
Safety, Security and Crisis Management COT, 
a total of 72 lone wolf terrorist incidents 
accounted for only 1.28 percent of the total 
number of terrorist incidents in the US, 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Canada and 
Australia.7 This statistical quantité négligable 
turns these incidents into the typical “black 
swan” occurrences that are almost 
impossible to categorise, systematise let 
alone predict.8 However, the number of lone 
wolf terrorist incidents seems to be on the 
rise. 
 
Increasing Numbers 
Following the COT/TTSRL report of 2007, 
which uses the RAND-MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base, and looking at more recent 
cases, two things become clear. First, the 
number of incidents has increased in recent 
decades. Second, lone wolves seem to come 
from all kinds of ideological and religious 
extremist corners. The COT/TTSRL report 
shows that in the United States, white 
supremacists top the list of attacks by lone 
wolves. Other groups that have produced at 
least a handful or more lone wolf terrorists 
are “Islamist fundamentalists”, 
“nationalists/separatists”, and “anti-
abortion” terrorists. There are few cases of 
left wing and separatist lone wolf incidents 
and a larger number of cases where the 
ideological background is unclear. The data 
analysed by Spaaij – based on the 
COT/TTSRL study – show that the 
phenomenon is more prevalent in the United 
States than in any other country and that it 
increased significantly during the past three 
decades.9 
                                                     
7 COT/TTSRL, 2007: pp.16-7 
8 Taleb, 2005 
9 Spaaij, 2010: p. 854 
Lone Wolf as a Tactic 
The increase in lone wolf terrorism in the US 
in the last three decades can partly be 
explained by the adoption and dissemination 
of this method by and amongst right wing 
extremists.10 For example, in the late 1990s 
the above mentioned white supremacists 
Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis explicitly 
encouraged fellow extremists to act alone in 
committing violent crimes.11 A few years 
earlier, white supremacist Louis Beam, a 
former Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations 
member, popularised the strategy of 
leaderless resistance.12 “His vision was one 
where ‘all individuals and groups operate 
independently of each other, and never 
report to a central headquarters or single 
leader for direction or instruction’”.13 And one 
can go back even further in time. Take for 
example the concept of “propaganda by 
deed” as propagated by the anarchist Mikhail 
Bakunin in the 19th century. His ideas 
inspired terrorist attacks in many parts of the 
Western world, killing and wounding high 
ranking civil servants, politicians and even 
heads of state, including the French 
president Carnot in 1894 and King Umberto I 
of Italy in 1900. 
 
In Islamist circles, the idea of support for 
small-scale, loosely organised terrorist 
attacks is also hardly new. In 2003, for 
instance, an article was published on 
extremist Internet forum Sada al Jihad 
(Echoes of Jihad), in which Osama bin Laden 
sympathisers were encouraged to take action 
without waiting for instructions.14 In 2006, a 
text authored by al Qaeda member Abu Jihad 
al-Masri, "How to fight alone", circulated 
widely in jihadist fora.15 Another prominent 
Salafi writer, Abu Musab al-Suri, also 
advocated acts of terrorism carried out by 
small, autonomous cells or individuals. He 
outlined a strategy for a global conflict taking 
the form of resistance by small cells or 
                                                     
10 Hamm, 2002 
11 COT/TTSRL, 2007: p.13 
12 Beam 1992 
13 COT/TTSRL, 2007: p.13 
14 ITAC/CIEM, 2007: p.4 
15 Clemons, 2010 
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individuals who keep organisational links to 
an absolute minimum.16  
 
More anonymous calls for spontaneous 
Islamist extremist action appear quite 
regularly on the Internet. In a reaction to the 
Ford Hood shooting in Time Magazine, Bruce 
Hoffman noted that "this new strategy of al-
Qaeda is to empower and motivate 
individuals to commit acts of violence 
completely outside any terrorist chain of 
command. […] The nature of terrorism is 
changing, and Major Hasan may be an 
example of that." He also argued that if 
"leaderless resistance" is the wave of the 
future, it may be less lethal but harder to 
fight; there are fewer clues to collect and less 
chatter to hear, even as information about 
means and methods is so much more widely 
dispersed.17  
 
One year earlier, an intelligence report by the 
Canadian government’s Integrated Threat 
Assessment Centre – “Lone-Wolf Attacks: A 
Developing Islamist Extremist Strategy?” – 
also expressed concern about the emerging 
threat posed by lone wolf Islamist terrorists. 
The report also stresses the importance of 
the Internet. It states that “[t]he Internet is 
helpful to an individual who may be preparing 
to conduct a lone-wolf attack, providing 
ideological motivation, encouragement, 
justification, all within an anonymous 
environment”.18 
 
Recent US examples of jihadi fighters who 
seem to have acted entirely on their own 
include the previously mentioned Nidal Malik 
Hassan and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad 
(2009). In Europe, there are only a few 
potential cases of Islamist lone wolf 
terrorists. In the Netherlands, a teenager 
named Yehya Kadouri threatened Dutch 
politicians and was trying to collect 
information and materials to make an 
explosive device (2004). More recently, there 
was the case of a Chechen-born amateur 
boxer living in Belgium who was injured in an 
                                                     
16 ITAC/CIEM, 2007: p.3 & Lia, 2007 
17 Time Magazine, 11 November 2009 
18 ITAC/CIEM, 2007: p.5 
explosion at a Copenhagen hotel while 
preparing a letter bomb (2010). 
 
As the above-mentioned examples indicate, 
there is a wide variety in target selection, use 
of weapons and modus operandi. Lone wolf 
attacks range from threatening and 
intimidating people to shootings and 
bombings. As a consequence, there is much 
variety in the profile of an attack, its lethality 
and impact. Moreover, huge differences exist 
in the time span of incidents ranging from a 
single attack – most cases – to a prolonged 
terror campaign, such as the case of Ted 
Kaczynsky enduring almost two decades. 
 
Commonalities 
Despite the many differences in background 
and tactics, there are some commonalities 
shared amongst various lone wolves. One 
common characteristic among lone wolves is 
that they do not “work and play well with 
others”. A classic example is Ted Kaczynski 
who lived in reclusion – a log cabin deep in 
the Montana wilderness – and shunned most 
forms of direct contact with the outside world. 
This is not to say that lone wolves have no 
connections to organisations, networks or 
scenes. In fact, many join extremist groups 
only to leave due to conflicting agendas or 
ideas, which are often too extreme even for 
the hard-core members of the group.19 
Hence, there is a degree of commitment to 
and identification with extremist movements; 
their solitary actions do not take place in a 
vacuum. This commonality is important in 
identifying and understanding the processes 
of radicalisation.20  
 
Another commonality among lone wolves is 
that – notwithstanding their operational 
reclusion – they often distribute their ideas or 
manifestos to the outside world, in some 
cases even prior to the actual attack. Ted 
Kaczynski published his own manifesto and 
wrote letters to local newspapers. Today, the 
Internet allows anyone to post his or her 
extremist ideology on the Web. Scott Roeder 
                                                     
19 Vic Artiga, 2010 
20 COT/TTSRL, 2007: pp.86-7 
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wrote a column entitled “Tiller Watch” that 
was posted throughout the Internet. Major 
Nidal Malik Hassan developed a Power Point 
presentation entitled “The Koranic World 
View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. 
Military”.21 Jessica Stern and others also 
observe that lone-wolf terrorists tend to 
create their own ideologies that combine 
personal frustrations and aversion with 
political, social or religious grievances.22  
 
A third shared attribute is the fact that 
although most terrorists do not suffer from 
any identifiable psychopathology, the rate of 
psychological disturbance and social 
ineptitude among lone wolves is relatively 
high.23 
 
The Challenge of Fighting Lone 
Wolf Terrorism 
Identifying, targeting, and arresting a lone 
wolf is very difficult. First of all, they are 
solitary actors, whose intentions are hard to 
discern since they avoid contact with others. 
As Fred Burton argues, “[w]hen militants are 
operating in a cell consisting of more than 
one person, there is a larger chance that one 
of them will get cold feet and reveal the plot 
to authorities, that law enforcement and 
intelligence personnel will intercept a 
communication between conspirators, or that 
law enforcement authorities will be able to 
introduce an informant into the group”.24  
 
Secondly,  it is very hard to predict from 
which disenfranchised, alienated or 
frustrated environment they stem. They 
display a variety of backgrounds with a wide 
spectrum of ideologies and motivations. For 
instance, the murder by the anti-abortionist 
Roetger and the US military recruiting office 
shooting by Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad 
occurred within the same week.   
 
Thirdly, it is extremely difficult to differentiate 
between those extremists who intend to 
                                                     
21 Vic Artiga, 2010 
22 COT/TTSRL, 2007: p.86 
23 Hewitt, 2003: p.80 & Spaaij, 2010: p.854 
24 Fred Burton, 2007 
commit attacks and those who simply 
express radical beliefs or issue hollow 
threats.25 In Western countries in general and 
in the US in particular, the freedom of speech 
is a fundamental freedom which limits 
possibilities to investigate non-violent radical 
scenes.  Knowing that all terrorists are radical 
but that most radicals are not terrorists, it is 
extremely difficult to single out potential lone 
wolves before they strike, even with the help 
of the most sophisticated intelligence 
gathering tools. With such a large universe of 
potential suspects, this is like collecting 
haystacks to find a needle.26  To make things 
even worse, according to Hoffman, the 
“leaderless resistance” is not only harder to 
fight than terrorism by an identifiable, 
organised conspiracy, but it is also more 
prone to spontaneous combustion.27 
 
Lastly, lone wolves inspire copycat behaviour, 
become role models for other alienated 
youngsters, and often invite band wagon 
attacks. Kazcynski’s manifesto still circulates 
on the internet, as do Bouyeri’s letters. Bomb 
letters, arson attacks and anthrax letters 
have a tendency to come in waves – although 
not necessarily by the same perpetrator. 
 
Challenges for the Lone Wolf 
Fortunately, there are also some operational 
constrains for the lone wolf, in executing a 
“successful” attack. Like any terrorist, they 
are hindered by the terrorist attack cycle. And 
because they are working alone, they have to 
conduct each step of the cycle by 
themselves. “This means that they are 
vulnerable to detection at several different 
junctures as they plan their attacks, the most 
critical of which is the surveillance stage of 
the operation.”28 In addition, these 
individuals often lack the knowledge, 
resources and contacts to skill themselves in 
preparing and executing violent acts. And 
although many websites and military manuals 
provide instructions on executing violence, 
                                                     
25 NCTb, 2010 
26 Fred Burton, 2007 
27 Time Magazine, 11 November 2009 
28 Stewart and Burton, 2009 
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such as making bombs, there is no substitute 
for hands-on experience in the real world.29 
Because of these difficulties, many lone 
wolves will at some instance have to step out 
of their vacuum. This makes them vulnerable 
to coming to somebody’s attention before 
they can conduct an attack. This vulnerability 
often occurs as they seek the skills or 
materials required to conduct a terrorist 
attack.30  
 
Counter-Terrorism Responses 
How to deal with the threat of lone wolf 
terrorism and the challenge to identify, target, 
and arrest persons acting entirely on their 
own? The debate on how to fight lone wolf 
terrorism is far from decided and remains to 
be reconciled with popular principles of 
freedom – as is the case with any exchange 
of those principles for security reasons. 
However, the above commonalities and 
challenges provide some clues as where to 
start with counter-terrorism responses.  
 
First of all, according to Alex Shone of the 
British Henry Jackson society, the key factor 
of the UK’s counter-terrorism approach to 
locating lone wolf attacks is knowing not who 
but how such attacks are formulated. In his 
essay, Shone also stresses the need to 
understand the radicalisation process of lone 
wolves. He argues that insight into these 
processes hold possible avenues for effective 
measures to prevent or counter the threat of 
lone wolf terrorism.31 Knowing how attacks 
are formulated requires a far more sensitive 
detection system at the tactical, sharp-end of 
operations. Counter-terrorism services need 
to be far more attuned to those signatures, 
as minimal as that might be, that an 
individual with a terrorist intent will inevitably 
give off in preparing their attack. This 
requires not only effective data capture and 
exploitation enabled by efficient overall 
information management, but also fused 
intelligence products. This fused intelligence 
must be genuine in its all-source origin and 
                                                     
29 Stewart and Burton, 2008 
30 Stewart and Burton, 2009 
31 Shone, 2010 
not simply single-source “contextualised”. In 
Shone’s opinion, “[i]ntelligence analysts and 
collectors must work in far closer unison, as 
well as alongside appropriate tradecraft 
specialists; from Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
experts to religious scholars.” Consequently, 
such measures could lead to insights and 
indicators of how lone wolf attacks are 
assembled, increasing the ability of 
interdiction forces to operate successfully to 
what he calls the “left of the bang” (i.e. all 
that happens prior to an attack). 
 
In the second place, given the commonality 
amongst many lone wolves that there is a 
degree of commitment to and identification 
with extremist movements and that their 
radicalisation does not take place in a 
vacuum, it is important to both investigate 
and cooperate with afflicted communities. 
Given the general opinion on effective 
counter-radicalisation strategy that its 
success depends on effective community 
engagement, it is essential to promote 
passive and active hostility towards the 
terrorist yolk in these communities with the 
help of influential members of relevant 
communities. According to Shone, such a 
community-based approach should ultimately 
foster a more advantageous operating 
environment for counter-terrorism actors 
providing them with more eyes and ears on 
the ground and increase their interdiction 
capacity. In the long run, “[r]esolution of 
these crises shall inevitably be the 
responsibility of effective, communal 
guidance and mentoring”.32 
 
In the third place, even seemingly 
spontaneous combustion is often triggered by 
a catalyst event. It could be rewarding to 
study and compare the nature of potential 
triggers or catalyst events in the 
radicalisation processes of lone wolves.33 Are 
they located in the private domain, are they 
provided by political developments? Or are 
triggers even mastered by “entrepreneurs of 
violence” who call upon their anonymous 
followers to become active. 
                                                     
32 Shone, 17 May 2010 
33 See for instance Veldhuis and Staun, 2009 
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In the fourth place, exactly because lone 
wolves – although operating alone – draw 
inspiration from other extremists or 
ideologues, counter narratives are important 
elements of such a strategy. Shone speaks of 
“psychological operations” that must be 
stepped up to match the stride of terrorists’ 
effective exploitation of UK operations in 
Afghanistan; and to eventually overtake them 
and diminish their impact. “This factor 
extends also to psychological operations 
conducted against the portrayal of suicide 
bombings. Such events, as the most extreme 
manifestation of radicalization, must be 
utilised against the perpetrators to 
delegitimize their credibility”.34 
 
In the fifth place, although lone wolves are no 
part of hierarchical organisations, they do 
have a context. Awareness programs for 
parents, schools, universities could be 
interesting to reflect upon – obviously without 
launching large scale public campaigns that 
only serve to create a moral panic. 
 
Lastly, communicating on the one hand the 
threat of lone wolves to relevant target 
audiences, but on the other hand refraining 
from handing them the public theatre they 
strive for, is one of the largest challenges for 
counter-terrorism actors. Handling lone 
wolves below public surface, by intelligence 
and investigating squads is one core principle 
of preventing lone wolves from installing fear 
and chaos in society. 
 
One last caveat should be formulated. By 
targeting measures against lone wolf 
terrorism according to knowledge of how and 
not who, it is possible to diminish the threat 
while adhering to principles of fundamental 
freedoms and civil liberties. Focusing on the 
“who are they?” question not only 
necessitates a great deal of time and 
resources, but may easily lead to ‘ethnic 
profiling’ or to pursuing individuals who are 
not planning to move from radical beliefs to 
radical action. After all, it is extremely difficult 
                                                     
34 Shone, 17 May 2010 
to differentiate between violent radicals and 
(the much larger group of) non-violent 
radicals. Hence, a broad strategy with a 
strong focus on interdiction, prevention and 
intelligence gathering by means of 
interpersonal contact might be more effective 
approach to counter lone wolf terrorism than 
a more repressive approach with an 
emphasis on more technical intelligence 
gathering disciplines. 
 
Many Unanswered Questions 
As mentioned- earlier, the question of how 
best to fight lone wolf terrorism is far from 
decided. The answers on the “how?” question 
regarding modus operandi of lone wolf 
terrorists and their radicalization processes 
are preliminary ones that deserve further 
investigation. And with the apparent increase 
of Islamist lone wolf terrorism, new questions 
pop up, for instance about the development 
of the concept of “leaderless jihad”, the role 
of the Internet and the possible impact of 
attacks by Islamist lone wolves on societies in 
general and Muslim communities and 
Islamist subgroups in particular. Will there be 
a potential contamination or inspiration effect 
of Islamist lone-wolf terrorism? And is there a 
link between successful counter-terrorism 
measures against Islamist terrorist networks 
and the increase in propaganda to take solo 
action without waiting instructions?  
 
The fact that there are – fortunately – few 
cases we can learn from makes it a difficult 
task to understand the “how” of lone wolf 
terrorism. Therefore, sharing experiences, 
data and ideas regarding this particular 
terrorist threat between practitioners, policy 
makers and academics is essential to be able 
to find at least some answers to the many 
unanswered questions. The ICCT expert 
meeting on Lone Wolves provided that 
opportunity, focusing on the concept of a 
broad strategy with a strong focus on both 
interdiction and prevention as well as the role 
of human intelligence. 
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